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Martin A. Nowak explores how reputation and repetition have driven the evolution of 
prosocial behavior in human interaction. Winning strategies are generous, hopeful and 
forgiving. 
 
One day while I was still at Oxford, Bob May gave me some advice: “You never lose for 
being too generous”. I was impressed because Bob is a winner. To him winning a game is 
everything. He has thought more deeply about winning and losing than anyone else I 
know. Strategic thinking is his basic instinct. As his wife once said, “When he plays with 
the dog, he plays to win.” At the time, Bob was not only my advisor but also that of the 
British Government. A few years later he would become President of the Royal Society, 
Lord May of Oxford, and the recipient of many prestigious awards. 
 
A mathematical analysis of human behaviour suggests that Bob was right. Generosity is 
an essential feature of winning strategies in games that explore human interactions. These 
strategies underpin many of the choices people make in every day life, but also shed light 
on how our unusually cooperative ways could have evolved.  
 
Biologists recognize two fundamental forces of evolution: mutation and selection. I want 
to add a third: cooperation. The definition of cooperation is somewhat technical, but the 
following statement conveys the basic principle: cooperation occurs when one individual 
pays a cost so that another receives a benefit. Here, cost and benefit are measured in 
terms of reproductive success. Reproduction can be genetic or cultural, the latter 
involving the spread of knowledge and ideas. 
 
Only if certain mechanisms are involved can natural selection favour individuals who 
reduce their own fitness to increase that of a competitor. One such mechanism is direct 
reciprocity. Here, my strategy depends on what you have done to me. Another is indirect 
reciprocity: my strategy depends on what you have done to me and on what you have 
done to others. 
 
In both circumstances, mathematical analysis shows that winning strategies tend to be 
generous, hopeful and forgiving. Generous here means not seeking to get more than one’s 
opponent; hopeful, means cooperating in the first move or in the absence of information; 
and forgiving, means attempting to reestablish cooperation after an accidental defection. 
These three traits are related. If I am generous, it is easier for me to forgive, and also to 
be hopeful and take the risk of cooperating with newcomers.  
 
In the Wimbledon championship, you must defeat your opponent to move to the next 
round. But everyday life is not like a tennis tournament. Instead, most of our interactions 
occur in a population of players, and payoff accumulates over encounters with many 
different people. Because overall success is proportional to that payoff sum, the other 
person in any one encounter is more a partner than an opponent. If I am willing to let 
others have a slightly bigger share of the pie, then people will want to share pies with me. 
Generosity bakes successful deals.   
Experiments have confirmed the success of generosity. A typical setup involves students 
and computer screens. The computer pairs random individuals. One person, the donor, is 
asked if she wishes to transfer some money to the recipient. She is informed about the 
recipient’s decisions in previous rounds with other players. The experiment shows that 
people base their decision on what the recipient has done before. Generous people are 
more likely to receive donations. 
 
Similar reputation-based systems operate in e-commerce. If you have a choice of buying 
a camera from many different websites, you might consider both the price and the seller’s 
reputation. Consumers are willing to pay higher prices if the seller is thought to be 
reliable. Successful websites are those with good reputations.  
  
So why aren’t humans always ‘generous, hopeful and forgiving’? Part of the explanation 
is that cooperation is never a stable state. Mathematical studies show that cooperation is 
constantly challenged by defection. In a society of defectors, where no-one helps, a 
cluster of cooperation can emerge, if a few people switch to tit-for-tat. If I play tit-for-tat, 
I do whatever you have done to me. Tit-for-tat can’t persist for long, because its appetite 
for revenge is self-destructive. It is soon replaced by ‘generous tit-for-tat’. Here I 
cooperate whenever you have cooperated, but sometimes I cooperate even if you have 
defected. I am forgiving. For a while, cooperation thrives. But in a generous tit-for-tat 
population, the emergence of unconditional cooperators eventually invites the invasion of 
defectors. This process leads to cycles of cooperation and defection, which account, in 
part, for the mix of cooperators and defectors that persists in human societies.  
 
Mathematical analysis is an essential tool for understanding the fundamental aspects of 
human behaviour. The games described here occur in every human society. Ancestral 
humans spent most of their time in small groups where interactions were repeated. The 
same is true for most dealings in modern life, repeat encounters are always possible and 
reputation is typically at stake. The evolution of pro-social behaviour cannot be 
understood outside the framework of direct or indirect reciprocity. Indeed I believe that 
games of indirect reciprocity have provided the crucial selection pressures for social 
intelligence and human language.  
 
In games of indirect reciprocity, social intelligence is needed to monitor and interpret the 
interactions of others. We follow with great interest what our fellow creatures do to us 
and what they do to others. When deciding how to act, we take into account — often 
subconsciously — the possible consequences for our own reputation. Moreover, our own 
observations are often not enough; we want to learn from the experiences of others. 
Spreading the rumours of indirect reciprocity requires language. As my colleague David 
Haig once remarked “for direct reciprocity you need a face, for indirect reciprocity you 
need a name”.  
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